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AMICUS BRIEFS:  
SOUNDING OFF ON REFORMING 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
Joy Lynn Bala* 
Inequitable conduct, which has been characterized as an “absolute 
plague” and an “atomic bomb,” allows an accused infringer to assert 
an affirmative defense against a patentee for violating the duty of 
candor and good faith in acquiring a patent. The consequences of this 
“atomic bomb” extend well beyond the litigation context and 
significantly impact the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 
patent agents, and patent attorneys. Such consequences include 
exorbitant litigation costs, overdisclosure to the PTO and thus 
decreased efficiency by PTO examiners, disciplinary action and 
potential disbarment of patent agents and attorneys, and even 
decreased innovation. The Federal Circuit’s recent en banc, 6–1–4 
decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. attempted to 
reshape the doctrine. However, the decision also highlighted the court’s 
varying viewpoints, and the optimistic majority may not have cured the 
doctrine’s problems. Courts are responsive to the differing roles of 
patents in the myriad industries that patent law affects, and courts often 
turn to amicus briefs, which provide an important source of information 
regarding the role of patents within varying innovation contexts. 
Amicus briefs thus constitute key sources of empirical data that can be 
used in studying the patent system. As a result, these briefs can be 
particularly influential. Therefore, this Note’s analysis of the thirty-four 
amicus briefs in Therasense sheds light on the various commercial and 
societal concerns of patent law and, most importantly, on the impact 
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that inequitable conduct has on these myriad interests. This Note 
discusses data that were gathered from the briefs and that center on the 
three doctrinal components of inequitable conduct: materiality, intent, 
and the balancing step. Furthermore, this Note proposes a solution that 
focuses on the three prongs in light of the different arguments that the 
amici proposed: (1) courts should adopt Rule 1.56 as the materiality 
standard, which the Federal Circuit can further clarify by establishing 
factors for lower courts to consider in evaluating this prong; (2) courts 
should require a specific intent to deceive to satisfy the intent prong; 
and (3) courts should eliminate a sliding scale approach to the 
balancing step and maintain the harsh penalty of unenforceability. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In patent law, commentators have extensively criticized and 
characterized inequitable conduct as an “absolute plague”1 and an 
“atomic bomb.”2 The doctrine of inequitable conduct allows an 
accused infringer to assert an affirmative defense against a patentee 
for violating the duty of candor and good faith during the patentee’s 
acquisition of the patent. The consequences of this “atomic bomb” 
extend well beyond the litigation context and significantly impact the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), patent agents, and patent 
attorneys. Such consequences include exorbitant litigation costs, 
disciplinary actions against and potential disbarment of patent agents 
and attorneys, and even decreased innovation; moreover, the doctrine 
incentivizes patent applicants to overdisclose information to the 
PTO, thereby decreasing the efficiency of PTO examiners.3 Scholars 
and practitioners have extensively discussed these problems and have 
called for reform.4 
In Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,5 the Federal 
Circuit granted a request for an en banc hearing regarding inequitable 
conduct,6 signaling the court’s recognition of the need to resolve 
issues surrounding the doctrine. Although the court appears to have 
 
 1. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 2. Randall R. Rader, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit: Foreword: Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM. 
U. L. REV. 777, 782 (2010). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See, e.g., David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 946 (2010); 
Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 593–94 (2009). 
 5. 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curium), opinion reinstated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 6. Id. Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. (“Abbott”), the successor to Therasense, Inc. and a 
subsidiary of Abbott Laboratories, brought a patent infringement suit against defendants Becton, 
Dickinson and Co., its supplier Nova Biomedical Corp., and Bayer HealthCare LLC, for Abbott’s 
U.S. Patent No. 5,820, 551 (the “’551 patent”). Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 
F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curium), opinion 
reinstated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The defendants then asserted that their 
products did not infringe Abbott’s patents and that the patents were invalid. Id. Subsequently, the 
District Court held the ’551 patent unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Id. On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding. Id. at 1311. However, the majority and 
dissent viewed materiality and intent differently. Id. at 1312 (Linn, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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reshaped the doctrine,7 its 6–1–4 decision also shows how the 
Federal Circuit features many varying viewpoints. Moreover, some 
scholars have already suggested that the optimistic majority may not 
have fashioned a test to cure all of the doctrine’s problems.8 Thus, 
the story surrounding inequitable conduct may not be over.9 
Prior to the en banc hearing, the Federal Circuit not only asked 
the parties to file briefs addressing the current standards of the 
doctrine but also called for amici to voice their concerns on the 
matter.10 More than thirty amicus briefs, each articulating its own 
viewpoint on inequitable conduct, were filed. 
Amici importantly represent patentees, the “fourth pillar” of the 
patent system.11 The courts are responsive to the differing roles of 
patents in the myriad industries affected by patent law,12 and the 
courts often turn to amicus briefs, which provide an important source 
of information regarding the role of patents within varying 
innovation contexts.13 The Federal Circuit has stated that the number 
and diversity of the briefs “reflect the complexity of these 
[commercial and societal] concerns,” which lies “not in the fate of 
these litigants and these long-expired patents” but “in the way this 
judge made law affects technologic innovation and competition.”14 
Furthermore, amicus briefs can influence the courts—including the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court—and appear to be more cost-
 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First 
Impression, (Aug. 5, 2011) (unpublished essay), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859764. 
 9. In July 2011, the PTO proposed “to revise the materiality standard for the duty to 
disclose information to the [PTO] in patent applications and reexamination proceedings set forth 
in §§ 1.56(b) and 1.555(b) in light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense.” Revision of 
the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent 
Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43631, 43632 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be codified as amended at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). The PTO even sought comments concerning the proposed rule change. Id. 
 10. Therasense, 374 F. App’x at 35. For a discussion of the en banc holding, see infra 
Part II. 
 11. The three other pillars are represented by Congress, the courts, and the PTO. Colleen V. 
Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System 5 
(Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 10–05, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1608111&rec=1&srcabs=1656568. 
 12. Id. at 6 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)). 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
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effective than lobbying Congress is; thus, because of their 
effectiveness, the briefs are an attractive means for commentators to 
voice concerns.15 Because of these advantages, amicus interest is at 
an all-time high.16 
Amicus briefs constitute a key source of empirical data for 
studying the patent system.17 For example, Colleen V. Chien found 
that patentees and their lawyers, “creators” of the patents, composed 
75 percent of briefs that were filed in the Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit from 1989 to 2009.18 The remaining 25 percent were filed by 
public interest advocates and “consumers” of patented goods, such as 
citizen groups, governments, and academics.19 Moreover, Chien 
determined that the Supreme Court ruled in alliance with the position 
that the United States advocated in every instance but one.20 
According to Chien’s findings, amicus briefs that the United States 
and PTO filed predicted the prevailing party in 90 percent of 
Supreme Court cases and in 80 percent of Federal Circuit cases.21 
Additionally, Chien found that a company’s business model can 
predict the position that it would take in any amicus brief.22 For 
example, patent holding companies and universities—which often 
have limited exposure as patent defendants yet often have significant 
opportunities as patent licensors or plaintiffs—heavily favor strong 
patent rights for the patentee, while public companies often oppose 
the patentee.23 
Analysis of the thirty-four briefs that were filed in Therasense 
can shed light on the various commercial and societal concerns of 
patent law and, most importantly, on the impact of inequitable 
conduct on these myriad interests. Moreover, because amicus briefs 
significantly influence the Federal Circuit, these briefs can also 
provide insight into how inequitable conduct should be changed. 
 
 15. Chien, supra note 11, at 6. 
 16. For example, more than sixty-five non-party amicus briefs were filed in the recent 
Supreme Court case Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Id. at 4. 
 17. Id. at 5–6. 
 18. Id. at 13, 15–16. 
 19. Id. at 16–17. 
 20. Id. at 31. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 34. 
 23. Id. at 25. 
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Part II.A discusses the historical development of inequitable conduct, 
and Part II.B presents the numerous drawbacks of the doctrine that 
caught the attention of an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit. 
Part II.C discusses the recent en banc Therasense decision and 
suggests that the test may not be a cure-all for the doctrine. Part III 
briefly describes the design and methodology that this Note employs 
in analyzing these amicus briefs, including an explanation of why 
this Note’s study is important. Part IV presents a summary and 
analysis of data that are gathered from the briefs; it focuses 
particularly on the doctrinal components of materiality, intent, and 
the balancing step. Part IV also includes a comparison to Chien’s 
findings in an attempt to highlight any revelations that are unique to 
inequitable conduct. Part V proposes a solution that differs slightly 
from that in the recent Therasense decision and that focuses on the 
three main prongs of inequitable conduct in light of the different 
arguments that the amici proposed: (1) the maintenance of specific 
intent to deceive as the standard for intent; (2) the elimination of 
sliding scale formulations of the balancing step, and the maintenance 
of the harsh penalty of unenforceability; and (3) the use of 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.56 (“Rule 1.56”) as the standard for materiality with delineated 
factors for courts to use in determining if information is material. 
II.  INEQUITABLE CONDUCT:  
PRE- AND  
POST-THERASENSE 
A.  Historical Development 
Inequitable conduct is a judicially created doctrine that 
originated from a trilogy of Supreme Court cases.24 In each of these 
cases, the entire patent acquisition and enforcement process had been 
tainted with egregious fraud, perjury, and extortion; without such 
fraudulent conduct, the patent right would not have been 
enforceable.25 The only remaining question for the Supreme Court 
was how the fraudulent conduct should affect the patentee’s case.26 
 
 24. Rader, supra note 2, at 779–80; see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. 
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 
(1944), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); 
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933). 
 25. Rader, supra note 2, at 779, 781. 
 26. Id. at 779–80. 
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The trilogy culminated in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. 
Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,27 where the Supreme Court 
fashioned an inequitable conduct defense from the equitable doctrine 
of unclean hands.28 Although the Supreme Court did not articulate a 
specific test or provide detailed guidance on inequitable conduct, the 
doctrine developed over the next few decades with influences from 
the courts and the PTO.29 
An alleged patent infringer may assert inequitable conduct as an 
affirmative defense to patent infringement when an applicant violates 
the duty of candor and good faith.30 As the doctrine stood prior to the 
en banc holding in Therasense, inequitable conduct was composed of 
(1) materiality; (2) intent; and (3) an equitable balancing step.31 A 
finding of inequitable conduct rendered the entire patent 
unenforceable and could even have adversely affected other related 
patents.32 Because of its harsh penalties, inequitable conduct satisfied 
two important goals: (1) enforcing the “duty of good faith and fair 
dealing that binds patent applicants in dealing with the public”; and 
(2) protecting the “social utility of the patent system, i.e., it attempts 
to diminish the probability that unscrupulous individuals wrongfully 
obtain undeserved rents.”33 
Materiality, the first element, focused on whether affirmative 
misrepresentations or omissions of information were material;34 this 
element also still applies post-Therasense. During the ex parte 
 
 27. 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
 28. Id. at 815–16, 819–20. 
 29. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 597. In fact, the PTO created Rule 1.56 in response to 
the Precision Court’s decision; Rule 1.56 was subsequently amended over the following decades, 
and it reached its present form in 1992. Id. at 597, 600. For a discussion of Rule 1.56, see infra 
notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 30. See, e.g., Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: 
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 147–48 (2006) (citing DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[6][b][ii] (2004)). 
 31. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An 
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686102. 
 32. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or 
more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is unenforceable.”); see 
also Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding several 
patents unenforceable after determining that inequitable conduct occurred). 
 33. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 3 n.2. 
 34. See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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process of obtaining a patent, patent applicants had to abide by 
Rule 1.56 while they dealt with the PTO,35 as they still must do 
today. The rule imposes a “duty of candor and good faith” on “[e]ach 
individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent 
application.”36 This includes a “duty to disclose to the Office all 
information known to that individual to be material to patentability” 
that extends to all pending claims.37 According to subsection (b) of 
Rule 1.56: 
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not 
cumulative to information already of record or being made 
of record in the application, and (1) It establishes, by itself 
or in combination with other information, a prima facie case 
of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It refutes or is 
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) 
Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the 
Office or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.38 
The rule additionally states that a prima facie case of 
unpatentability is established “when the information compels a 
conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of 
evidence.”39 Thus, the PTO explicitly defined a materiality standard 
and the appropriate level of disclosure necessary for a patentee to 
satisfy the PTO’s regulations. Although several standards existed for 
finding information as material,40 courts typically used the 
“reasonable examiner” test, which evaluates if a reasonable examiner 
would have considered the information “important in deciding 
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.”41 
 
 35. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010); Petherbridge, supra note 31, at 4. 
 36. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. § 1.56(b). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he objective ‘but for’ standard, where the misrepresentation was so material that the patent 
should not have issued; the subjective ‘but for’ test, where the misrepresentation actually caused 
the examiner to approve the patent application when he would not otherwise have done so; the 
‘but it may have’ standard, where the misrepresentation may have influenced the patent examiner 
in the course of prosecution. . . . [; and Rule 1.56,] yet a fourth ‘official standard.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 41. Id. at 1315 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56). 
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The second element of inequitable conduct required the court to 
determine whether the patent applicant intended to deceive or 
mislead the PTO;42 this prong remains a key component of the 
doctrine today. Intent to deceive did not need to be proven by direct 
evidence, but could have been inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances of the applicant’s alleged conduct.43 Prior to 
Therasense, the only clear doctrinal constraint on intent to deceive 
was that it had to be greater than gross negligence.44 
Both materiality and intent had to be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.45 Once threshold levels of both elements were 
satisfied, courts balanced all of the evidence to determine whether 
the applicant behaved inequitably, and courts ultimately concluded 
whether the conduct was sufficiently culpable to warrant a finding of 
unenforceability.46 During the balancing step, some courts considered 
a “sliding scale,” where a higher level of materiality allowed a court 
to accept a lower level of intent as sufficient for a finding of 
inequitable conduct.47 
Because materiality and intent to deceive were conclusions of 
ultimate fact based on broad factual inquiries, these elements were 
only “reviewed for clear error or substantial evidence” on appeal.48 
Moreover, appellate courts reviewed the balancing step by applying 
an abuse of discretion standard, an even more deferential form of 
review.49 Thus, alleged infringers who were victorious at the trial 
level in demonstrating a patentee’s inequitable conduct secured 
judgments that received some insulation from appellate courts due to 
the deferential standard of review.50 
 
 42. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 43. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 44. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 6. 
 45. E.g., Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1313. 
 46. Id. 
 47. E.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Questions of 
‘materiality’ and ‘culpability’ are often interrelated and intertwined, so that a lesser showing of 
the materiality of withheld information may suffice when an intentional scheme to defraud is 
established, whereas a greater showing of the materiality of withheld information would 
necessarily create an inference that its nondisclosure was ‘wrongful.’”). 
 48. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 7 (citations omitted). 
 49. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693–94 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 50. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 7. 
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B.  Inequitable Conduct’s  
Shortcomings 
Although the three elements of inequitable conduct were well 
known, the test remained vague, causing some scholars to complain 
of pervasive confusion and varying applications by the courts. The 
unclear standards and harsh punishment associated with the doctrine 
yielded several drastic consequences, impacting the patentees and 
their industries, the court system, the PTO, and patent agents and 
attorneys. 
A scholar even described the remedy for inequitable conduct as 
“death-penalty-like.”51 Denial of patent protection for the entire 
length of the patent term could result from a patent applicant’s 
failure to disclose information to the PTO without regard to any 
inherent traits of the patented invention itself. Thus, a finding of 
inequitable conduct rendered the entire patent unenforceable and 
prevented the patentee from asserting the patent’s claims against 
other infringers.52 This harsh penalty could even extend to related 
patents, rendering those unenforceable as well.53 Furthermore, a 
finding of inequitable conduct may make a case “exceptional” and 
thus entitle the accused infringer to attorney fees, which can easily 
reach into the seven-figure range.54 The patentee may even be 
exposed to antitrust liability.55 
Inequitable conduct has been viewed as a “plague” on the court 
system.56 Because of the vagueness of the doctrine and the complete 
unenforceability of the patent upon a finding of inequitable conduct, 
the defense has become too attractive an advantage for an accused 
patent infringer to ignore.57 Consequently, the accused infringers are 
incentivized to assert the defense whenever possible, including 
asserting the defense to infringement claims relating to patents that 
the defendants have not even been accused of infringing; moreover, 
 
 51. Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 725 (2009). 
 52. Id. at 764. 
 53. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(holding several patents unenforceable after finding inequitable conduct). 
 54. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 764 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 57. E.g., Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of 
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1346 (2009). 
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accused infringers take advantage of the vague standards of the 
doctrine by strategically choosing particular articulations of the test 
that are most favorable to their cases.58 Alleged infringers have 
asserted the defense in approximately 25 percent of all patent cases 
that have been filed, a number that even judges view as 
inappropriately high.59 
Asserting the defense of inequitable conduct also creates 
exorbitant litigation costs.60 Considering that the subjective element 
of intent often involves circumstantial evidence, summary judgment 
is particularly difficult, and thus litigation becomes costly.61 
Additionally, deposing the prosecuting attorney who handled the 
application is almost always necessary in these cases, but such 
depositions often involve complex attorney-client privilege issues, 
requiring their own additional attorneys and judicial resources to 
resolve.62 The actual validity of the patent becomes irrelevant to the 
doctrine as determinations of inequitable conduct turn into “satellite 
litigations where the effort expended has little spillover benefits for 
other parts of the litigation.”63 Unfortunately, the amount of time and 
effort spent on the defense tends to turn attention away from the 
actual core issues of a case—the validity and infringement of the 
patent at issue—and “hamper their complete and correct 
resolution.”64 
The doctrine also adversely impacts the PTO. Inequitable 
conduct requires only material information to be submitted, places no 
weight on the quantity of information that is submitted, and urges the 
patent applicant to avoid the submission of cumulative information.65 
However, because of the doctrine’s harsh penalty of unenforceability 
and the excessive litigation costs compared to the low cost of simply 
submitting all information in one’s possession to the PTO, the 
 
 58. Id. at 1346. 
 59. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 739–40 (citing Burlington Indus., 849 F.2d at 1422; 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984); FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY 156 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 740. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2008); Cotropia, supra note 51, at 763, 770. 
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doctrine actually incentivizes patent applicants to err on the side of 
quantity.66 Thus, as applicants disclose information that was only 
remotely relevant to the claimed subject matter, PTO examiners 
receive loads of information that are increasingly immaterial to the 
determination of patentability.67 Moreover, PTO examiners are 
already overworked as they face an increasing number of 
applications with a decreasing amount of time.68 Considering the 
highly technical information (the patent application and prior art) 
that the examiners must already process, abundant information that 
the applicant submits significantly overloads the examiner.69 
Similarly, overdisclosure may lead an examiner to waste time on 
immaterial information or even cause the examiner to become so 
overwhelmed that the examiner will ignore the applicant’s 
submission completely.70 Thus, “[t]he bigger the haystack, the more 
lost a needle becomes,” and the harm of the overload can negatively 
impact the examiner’s ability to reach a proper conclusion on the 
application’s patentability.71 
A finding of inequitable conduct may also affect patent agents or 
attorneys. A failure on behalf of the agents and attorneys to comply 
with the doctrine can become the basis of malpractice suits and lead 
to disciplinary action before the PTO.72 Agents and attorneys may 
even lose their licenses to practice before the PTO.73 Attorneys’ 
conduct may be referred to their state bar, which can also impose 
discipline or revoke attorneys’ general licenses to practice law.74 
Furthermore, personal costs may also be at stake, including one’s 
reputation within the patent community and with the PTO.75 
 
 66. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 763, 770. 
 67. Id. at 770. 
 68. Id. at 771. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 771–72. 
 72. See Edwin S. Flores & Sanford E. Warren, Jr., Inequitable Conduct, Fraud, and Your 
License to Practice Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 299, 314–15 (2000); David Hricik, How Things Snowball: The Ethical Responsibilities and 
Liability Risks Arising from Representing a Single Client in Multiple Patent-Related 
Representations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 459 (2005). 
 73. Flores & Warren, supra note 72, at 314–15. 
 74. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 766 (citing Flores & Warren, supra note 72, at 314–15). 
 75. Id. at 763 (citing Kelly Merkel, How to Stump a Corporate Lawyer: Means of Effective 
Legal Risk Management for IP Counsel, 1 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 1, 3 (2006)). 
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Inequitable conduct may also undermine innovation, which 
would be directly contrary to the patent system’s goals of fostering 
discovery, development, and investment of innovations.76 Small 
companies without experience or the resources that they need to 
prosecute their patent applications may not be able to minimize their 
vulnerability to allegations of inequitable conduct. For example, 
scientists and managers at these companies may act in good faith by 
undertaking a commonsense approach to disclosing information and 
yet will fail to realize that infringers may later turn their actions into 
material and intentional omissions.77 Fearing the threat of the 
consequences of inequitable conduct, investors in small companies 
may never spend the money that the companies need to turn 
innovative ideas into commercial products.78 
Yet, despite these shortcomings, some proponents of inequitable 
conduct argue that the doctrine polices conduct during the ex parte 
patent-application process before the PTO and thus remains useful.79 
The PTO issues an estimated 85 percent to 97 percent of filed 
patents, and thus, due to this high rate of issuance, it is quite likely 
that improperly granted patents do exist.80 Such patents can incur 
significant social and economic costs, but the doctrine can remedy 
these problems by preventing undeserving patentees from asserting 
infringement.81 
C.  Post-Therasense  
Inequitable Conduct 
The 6–1–4 en banc decision attempted to cure the ills of the 
doctrine and “tighten[] the standards for finding both intent and 
materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to 
 
 76. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (stating that the patent 
system “promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public 
to practice the invention once the patent expires”). 
 77. Brief of Amici Curiae Johnson & Johnson and the Procter & Gamble Co. in Support of 
Neither Party at 3, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390238. 
 78. See id. at 4. 
 79. See, e.g., Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: 
Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 147 (2005). 
 80. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 53 (Stephen 
A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
 81. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 79, at 148. 
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the detriment of the public.”82 The majority held that “but for” 
materiality is required for a finding of inequitable conduct; in making 
such a patentability determination, courts should apply the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.83 However, the majority also 
delineated a critical exception: “When the patentee has engaged in 
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an 
unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material.”84 The 
majority also clarified that “neither mere nondisclosure of prior art 
references to the PTO nor failure to mention prior art references in an 
affidavit constitutes affirmative egregious misconduct.”85 
To satisfy the intent element, the court held that an accused 
infringer “must prove that the [applicant misrepresented or omitted 
material information] with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.”86 
Simply showing that an applicant “knew of a reference, should have 
known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the PTO” 
does not satisfy this standard.87 
The court also demolished sliding scale formulations of the 
balancing step.88 Once materiality and intent are separately proven by 
clear and convincing evidence,89 a patent is only rendered 
unenforceable “where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the 
unfair benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim.”90 
Both the dissent and Judge O’Malley, who wrote an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the majority’s 
standard for intent and its requirement that intent and materiality be 
separately proven by clear and convincing evidence.91 However, the 
dissent argued that “[s]ince its first days, this court has looked to the 
PTO’s disclosure rule, Rule 56 . . . as the standard for defining 
materiality.”92 The dissent believed that “the PTO is in the best 
 
 82. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 83. Id. at 1291–92. 
 84. Id. at 1292. 
 85. Id. at 1292–93. 
 86. Id. at 1290. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1290, 1292. 
 90. Id. at 1292. 
 91. Id. at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting); id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 92. Id. at 1303 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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position to know what information examiners need to conduct 
effective and efficient examinations”; moreover, the dissent argued 
that the majority’s “higher standard of materiality . . . will not 
provide appropriate incentives for patent applicants to comply with 
the disclosure obligations the PTO places upon them.”93 
However, O’Malley believed that both the majority and the 
dissent “eschew flexibility in favor of rigidity,” and she disagreed 
with both approaches to materiality, finding that both “fail to provide 
district courts with flexibility to find inequitable conduct in an 
extraordinary case where the conduct in question would not be 
defined as such under either test.”94 O’Malley structured a test that 
she believed would allow district courts to exercise their discretion in 
inequitable inquiries, thereby respecting Supreme Court precedent 
that reflected the Court’s recognition of courts of equity.95 She 
argued that conduct should be deemed material where: 
(1) but for the conduct . . . , the patent would not have 
issued . . . ; (2) the conduct constitutes a false or misleading 
representation of fact . . . ; or (3) the district court finds that 
the behavior is so offensive that the court is left with a firm 
conviction that the integrity of the PTO process as to the 
application at issue was wholly undermined.96 
The en banc panel’s disagreement over materiality indicates that 
the doctrine’s reformation may not necessarily be complete. 
Moreover, scholars are already questioning the majority’s optimistic 
proclamations that the doctrine has been fixed for the better.97 Thus, 
the story of the doctrine’s development likely continues. 
III.  DESIGN AND  
METHODOLOGY 
The Federal Circuit recognized the need to reform the doctrine 
of inequitable conduct and sought the insight from amicus briefs on 
how the doctrine should be reformed. Amicus briefs generally 
represent a useful source of information that can shed insight into the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1298 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 95. Id. at 1298–99. 
 96. Id. at 1300. 
 97. See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 8. 
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many aspects of patent law and can even impact a court’s decision. 
The briefs filed in Therasense particularly highlighted the need to 
address the issues of inequitable conduct, and they illustrated the 
varying opinions—emanating from various facets of patent law—on 
how to alleviate the doctrine’s problems. 
The diversity of interests within patent law can be better 
understood by analyzing how patent stakeholders cluster in their 
amicus briefs.98 Colleen V. Chien previously undertook a large 
empirical study of amicus briefs that were filed in Supreme Court 
and Federal Circuit patent cases for the last twenty years in an 
attempt to better understand the patent system.99 Comparing the 
stance of the amici in Therasense with the stances of amici in 
Chien’s findings can further validate her results. Additionally, any 
differences with Chien’s findings may reveal aspects that are unique 
to inequitable conduct. For example, would patent practitioners with 
more at stake when they are faced with this affirmative defense argue 
differently than they would in other contexts of patent law? Such 
insight can prove useful in considering how inequitable conduct 
should be reformed. 
The author collected the Therasense amicus briefs100 and 
categorized them into the following groups: (1) the PTO; (2) bar 
associations and intellectual property associations; (3) intellectual 
property professors and intellectual property centers in academia; (4) 
public interest groups; and (5) industry, which is further subdivided 
into bio/pharma companies, high-tech companies, non-practicing 
entities (NPEs), and trade associations. Each brief was specifically 
analyzed for its arguments on materiality, intent, and the balancing 
step. 
After considering the standards for each of these three prongs 
and the corresponding levels of stringency that are required for 
application of the standards, the author drew conclusions on whether 
the amici favored patentee or non-patentee standards for inequitable 
conduct. For this discussion, the author assumed that a pro-patentee 
stance favors stringent standards for inequitable conduct, making it 
 
 98. Chien, supra note 11, at 6. 
 99. Id. 
 100. The briefs were collected either through Westlaw or by accessing PDF files from Tony 
Dutra, Therasense Briefs Ask Federal Circuit to Fix Inconsistency in Inequitable Conduct 
Rulings, 80 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 814 (2010). 
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difficult for an alleged infringer to successfully assert the defense.101 
For arguments of materiality, the author considered that the 
“reasonable examiner” test is the weakest and most in favor of non-
patentees. The author also concluded that an “objective but for” test 
is the most stringent standard and strongly favors patentees while 
Rule 1.56 falls in between these two extremes. For intent, the author 
considered “specific intent to deceive” to be a stringent standard that 
highly favors patentees; on the other hand, a “should have known” 
standard would highly favor non-patentees. 
Lastly, an unclear framework for the balancing step, when it is 
combined with heightened standards for materiality and intent, may 
adversely affect patentees by allowing for findings of inequitable 
conduct where there may not be any if a court had considered only 
the first two prongs. On the other hand, a carefully delineated 
standard for the balancing step and its strict application serves as an 
additional requirement that must be met to support a finding of 
inequitable conduct and thus likely favors patentees. Therefore, the 
author considered that the elimination of a balancing step without 
specific guideposts, such as a sliding scale formulation, and the 
clarification of an appropriate standard of this prong are pro-
patentee; those who argue for the test’s continuance in its vague state 
favor non-patentees. Moreover, arguments for matching the penalty 
to the conduct, and thus implementing less harsh remedies as 
opposed to only applying unenforceability in all instances, are also 
viewed as pro-patentee. 
The analysis that is presented in Part IV will include a 
comparison to Chien’s conclusions within each category based on 
her studies and a discussion of whether the briefs confirm 
perceptions of patent interests within particular categories.102 
 
 101. However, exceedingly difficult standards may also inadvertently lead to other 
consequences that may be harmful to patentees. Such high standards would likely make a finding 
of inequitable conduct exceptionally rare, allowing bad actors to obtain and enforce patents on 
innovations that likely do not deserve protection and would impute significant costs onto others 
within the system who act in good faith. See David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of 
Candor as a Limitation on the Duty of Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent 
Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 222 (2002) (“Large numbers of improvidently granted patents 
may create in terrorem effects on entrepreneurship, ranging from holdup licensing to patent 
thickets.”). Thus, stringent standards for inequitable conduct may not necessarily form a pro-
patent system. 
 102. The Author acknowledges that some results discussed below may be the result of a small 
sample size. 
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IV.  RESULTS:  
ANALYZING AMICI’S  
ARGUMENTS 
In Therasense, various amici, ranging from the PTO to an 
intellectual property association composed of law students, filed a 
total of thirty-four amicus briefs. Here, industry groups (including 
companies and trade associations) and membership groups composed 
of intellectual property attorneys and agents, represented 
44.1 percent and 35.3 percent of the total briefs, respectively. 
Together, these two groups accounted for nearly 80 percent of the 
amicus briefs that were filed in this case. “Patent consumers” 
(including the government), public interest groups, and academics 
(including professors and a university’s center for intellectual 
property law) represented the remaining 20.6 percent of the briefs. 
 
FIGURE 1. The Therasense Amici 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These results confirm the trend identified by Chien, who also 
found that IP lawyers and industries (“patent creators”) represented 
75 percent of the briefs that she studied, while citizen groups, 
governments, and academics (“patent consumers”) filed the 
remaining briefs.103 This trend demonstrates that the patent system is 
primarily focused on private interests; however, this is unsurprising 
considering the low number of consumer groups that are focused on 
 
 103. Chien, supra note 11, at 16. 
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patent issues, especially compared to the large number of groups that 
are focused on the interests of patent owners and attorneys.104 
A. The PTO 
The PTO unsurprisingly asserted that its own standard of 
materiality, Rule 1.56, should be adopted for three main reasons: (1) 
the agency is in the best position to know what information is 
essential for determining patentability; (2) the rule presents clear 
guidance for applicants; and (3) the rule is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent.105 By contrast, a narrow “but for” standard, where 
the patent would not have issued “but for” the misconduct, would 
allow applicants to freely “engage in a wide-variety of 
misconduct . . . so long as it cannot be proven later that the patent 
would not have issued ‘but for’ the misconduct.”106 According to the 
PTO, a “reasonable examiner” standard is simply too ambiguous and 
fails to provide meaningful guidance.107 
The PTO further argued that the proper standard for intent 
should be a specific intent to deceive, which would calm the fears of 
patent applicants and attorneys that drive them to overdisclose 
information to the PTO.108 A court may not infer intent solely from 
materiality, but the accused infringer must prove both elements 
separately by clear and convincing evidence.109 
According to the PTO, given the doctrine’s equitable nature, it 
would be inappropriate for a court to automatically hold a patent 
unenforceable after the court finds that both the materiality and intent 
prongs have been satisfied; therefore, the last element of the test 
should not be abolished.110 Instead, the PTO urged the court to clarify 
that the balancing step consists of neither a sliding scale nor a rigid 
rule but rather requires a court to consider all of the evidence to 
determine whether an unenforceability penalty is warranted only 
 
 104. Id. at 17. 
 105. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of 
Neither Party at 8–12, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390234, at *8–12. 
 106. Id. at 12–13. 
 107. Id. at 16–17. 
 108. Id. at 17, 18–22. 
 109. Id. at 25–26. 
 110. Id. at 25. 
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after the accused infringer successfully establishes materiality and 
intent by clear and convincing evidence.111 
The PTO’s stance for the application of Rule 1.56 did not 
entirely favor patentees. However, the PTO’s support for a specific 
intent to deceive test indicated its pro-patentee viewpoint. Yet, the 
PTO’s call for clarification of the balancing test may tend to favor 
patentees; additionally, its argument that courts should apply the 
harsh penalty only under limited circumstances indicated more of a 
preference for patentees. Thus, the PTO’s proposed standards for 
reforming inequitable conduct may lean toward a pro-patentee 
stance. This result tends to conflict with that in Chien’s study, which 
found that the government often tended to favor non-patentees.112 
Perhaps the PTO’s unexpected stance here signals its concern with 
the impact of inequitable conduct on the PTO, including such 
adverse consequences as overdisclosure and decreased efficiency by 
the PTO examiners. Thus, the PTO’s argument should carry 
significant weight.113 
B.  Bar Associations  
and Intellectual  
Property Associations 
Patent attorneys and agents, who are represented by bar and 
intellectual property associations, are typical amicus filers. In fact, in 
the briefs that Chien analyzed, six such associations reached her list 
of the “Top Ten” of all patent amici for their prolific brief filings;114 
four of these six filed briefs in Therasense. A total of twelve 
different membership groups—composed of patent attorneys, patent 
agents, and even intellectual property law students115—accounted for 
 
 111. Id. at 25–26. 
 112. Chien, supra note 11, at 26. 
 113. Notably, Chien also points out that federal government amici accurately predicted the 
winner in 90 percent of Supreme Court cases and in 80 percent of Federal Circuit cases. Id. at 31. 
However, the en banc panel disagreed with the PTO’s materiality view. Compare Therasense, 
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court does not 
adopt the definition of materiality in PTO Rule 56.”), with Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party at 13, supra note 105 (criticizing the 
“but for” standard). Perhaps, considering Chien’s findings, the Supreme Court’s holding may side 
with the PTO if questions regarding inequitable conduct are ever raised before the Court and the 
Court considers them. 
 114. Chien, supra note 11, at 20. 
 115. These include: Twenty-two patent prosecution firms and practitioners, American Bar 
Association (ABA), American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), Boston Patent 
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35 percent of the total number of amicus briefs that were filed in 
Therasense. In Chien’s findings, membership groups only accounted 
for 17 percent of the amici that she studied.116 Although the sample 
sizes may account for this difference in percentages, it is possible 
that these findings illustrate a heightened interest of attorneys and 
agents because of the potential personal consequences that they face 
with inequitable conduct. 
Four associations (AIPA, IPO, BPLA, and SDIPLA) and 
Patterson vouched for an objective “but for” materiality standard 
while WSPLA and FCBA supported the PTO’s Rule 1.56(b)(1) and 
(b)(1-2), respectively. Interestingly, WSPLA also recommended that 
common-law fraud should serve as the basis for inequitable 
conduct’s standards, where a misrepresentation or omission would be 
material only when at least one claim would not have issued; 
however, WSPLA also posited that this standard remains consistent 
with Rule 1.56(b)(1) since the failure of the prima facie test would 
correlate with the failure of the “but for” standard.117 Also of note, 
HIPLA advocated for a “middle ground” approach that falls between 
a reasonable examiner standard and a “but for”-type test: 
“information is ‘material’ if it was material under the PTO rules 
applicable at the time of the examination of the patent at issue.”118 
In considering intent, these amici appeared to agree that intent is 
a separate element from materiality and cannot be inferred from a 
high level of materiality alone. Such an inference would only be 
appropriate where it is the “single most reasonable inference” to be 
drawn from the evidence. Gross negligence would not be 
sufficient.119 
 
Law Association (BPLA), Conejo Valley Bar Association (CVBA), Federal Circuit Bar 
Association (FCBA), Houston Intellectual Property Law Association (HIPLA), Intellectual 
Property Owners Association (IPO), Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC), 
Patterson Thuente Christensen Pedersen, P.A. (Patterson), San Diego Intellectual Property Law 
Association (SDIPA), University of Kentucky Intellectual Property Law Association (UKIPLA), 
and Washington State Patent Law Association (WSPLA). Patterson is a mid-size intellectual 
property firm, but is placed in this category for simplicity and on the assumption that the firm’s 
concerns mirrors those of the other groups. 
 116. Chien, supra note 11, at 16. 
 117. Amicus Curiae Brief by Washington State Patent Law Ass’n Supporting Neither Party at 
10, 15, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595). 
 118. Brief of the Houston Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of No 
Party at 8, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 
3390231, at *8; see infra Table 1. 
 119. See infra Table 1. 
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Several amici in this category argued for the removal of the 
balancing step and a return to the principles of common-law fraud.120 
Although SDIPLA also argued for the balancing framework to be 
removed, it also advocated a slightly different proposition: find 
inequitable conduct when information that the patentee intentionally 
withheld or misrepresented meets or exceeds Rule 1.56 and tailor an 
appropriate remedy where unenforceability is imposed only if the 
nature of the withheld or misrepresented information exceeds an 
objective “but for” standard.121 On the other hand, three amici 
(FCBA, IPO, and HIPLA) actually supported the balancing step; 
however, FCBA and IPO also argued that the court must clarify the 
importance of this step, which the court should only use as an 
exercise of its equitable discretion and where it weighs materiality 
and intent to determine if unenforceability is warranted.122 Other 
amici, such as CVBA and WSPLA, also echoed the argument that 
the penalty should be based on the degree of the inequitable 
conduct.123 
Within this category, several amici appeared to support a “but 
for” materiality standard that strongly favors patentees; others who 
addressed the prong argued for standards that clearly favor neither 
pro- nor anti-patentees. A stable consensus could be found within 
intent, where a significant majority of this category of amici 
supported a stringent intent standard. Moreover, several of these 
amici supported the removal of the balancing step or a return to 
common-law fraud principles, standards that would likely increase a 
 
 120. See, e.g., Brief and Appendix of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 19–20, 
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 2751537, at 
*16 (“[A] better standard for determining inequitable conduct is one where the following 
elements have been shown, each by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a person having a duty of 
candor and good faith to the PTO misrepresented or omitted material information from the PTO; 
(2) in the absence of such misrepresentation or omission, the PTO, acting reasonably, would not 
have granted or maintained in force at least one patent claim; and (3) the misrepresentation or 
omission was made with a specific intent to deceive the PTO, which intent cannot be established 
by the mere materiality of the misrepresentation or omission.”). 
 121. Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Ass’n in Support of Neither 
Party at 5, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 
3390230, at *5. 
 122. Brief of the Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of No Party at 3, 
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390230, at 
*3; Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 14, Therasense, 
649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595). 
 123. Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Ass’n at 6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595); see infra Table 1. 
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court’s difficulty in finding inequitable conduct and therefore favor a 
patentee. Arguments ensuring that the penalty matches the conduct 
also illustrated these amici’s concerns for patentees. Thus, overall, 
this category appeared to somewhat favor patentees.124 
Chien found that, although bar associations and intellectual 
property associations are generally perceived as pro-patentee, they 
only filed briefs on behalf of patentees 55 percent of the time.125 But, 
considering that patent attorneys and agents face personal 
consequences that are as harsh as disbarment due to a finding of 
inequitable conduct, it seems unsurprising that the associations 
representing them would argue for stringent standards and that the 
Therasense case would be a predictable opportunity for these groups 
to file briefs on behalf of the patentees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124. See infra Table 1. One amicus even argued that the conduct be based entirely on 
“objectively lawful standards,” which would serve the public interest. Brief of Amicus Curiae 
University of Kentucky Intellectual Property Law Society in Support of Neither Party at 17, 
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595). 
 125. Chien, supra note 11, at 26 n.162. 
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TABLE 1. Summary of Arguments by Bar Associations  
and Intellectual Property Associations  
That Demonstrate Their Pro-Patentee Stance126 
Bar/IP 
Association 
Standard of 
Materiality Intent Balancing Other 
ABA “But for” 
Intent may be proven by 
direct and circumstantial 
evidence, but not by mere 
materiality 
Replace and follow 
common-law fraud 
principles 
— 
AIPLA “But for” 
Gross negligence is 
insufficient; inference of 
intent may not be based on 
a finding that applicant 
should have known of 
materiality; cannot infer 
from materiality alone, but 
applicant’s “knowledge of 
materiality” may be 
considered in the totality 
of circumstances 
Replace and follow a 
standard for finding 
fraud on PTO based on 
the totality of the 
circumstances 
— 
IPO Objective “but for” 
Cannot infer intent solely 
from materiality; clear and 
convincing evidence of 
specific intent to deceive 
is required 
Maintain balancing as an 
exercise of the court’s 
equitable discretion in 
finding a remedy after 
intent and materiality are 
affirmatively determined 
— 
22 Patent 
Prosecution 
Firms/ 
Practitioners 
— 
Clear evidence of 
deceptive intent is 
required 
Abandon — 
BPLA Objective “but for” Separate from materiality — — 
IPLAC — — — 
Return doctrine to 
common-law roots of 
fraud; patent 
unenforceability 
should only apply for 
the most egregious 
cases 
SDIPLA 
Meets or 
exceeds Rule 
1.56 and 
objective 
“but for” 
standard 
Intent cannot be inferred 
solely from materiality 
If information meets or 
exceeds Rule 1.56, the 
court may fashion a 
remedy based on the 
level of materiality; if 
materiality meets the 
objective “but for” 
standard, the patent is 
held unenforceable 
— 
 
 126. Supra Part IV.B; see Brief for Amici Curiae 22 Patent Prosecution Firms & Practitioners 
Supporting Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,  
-1595), 2010 WL 3390223; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Intellectual Property Law Ass’n of 
Chicago Supporting Neither Affirmance nor Reversal, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-
1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390227; Brief of Amicus Curiae University of 
Kentucky Intellectual Property Law Society in Support of Neither Party, supra note 124; Brief for 
Amicus Curiae Patterson Thuente Christensen Pedersen, P.A., in Support of Neither Party, 
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595). 
  
150 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:125 
Bar/IP 
Association 
Standard of 
Materiality Intent Balancing Other 
HIPLA 
PTO rules 
applicable at 
time of 
examination 
of the patent 
at issue 
Requires clear and 
convincing evidence; 
inference should only be 
made where it is the single 
most reasonable inference 
Modify with heightened 
standards — 
CVBA — — — 
A finding of 
inequitable conduct is 
only for exceptional 
cases; judges should 
decide; the penalty 
should be based on 
the degree of 
inequitable conduct 
FCBA Current Rule 1.56(b) 
Gross negligence, knew, 
and should have known 
are insufficient to prove 
intent; may not be inferred 
from materiality only, but 
the degree of materiality 
should determine the type 
or quality of the evidence 
needed to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence; 
courts must find intent to 
deceive PTO is the single 
most reasonable inference 
If the first two prongs 
are established by clear 
and convincing 
evidence, then courts 
must determine in equity 
whether the patent is 
unenforceable 
— 
UKIPLA — — — 
Replace current 
framework and at a 
minimum modify the 
test to emphasize the 
public interest in 
patents 
WSPLA 
Common-law 
fraud 
standards 
A specific, fraudulent 
intent to deceive is 
required 
Court has the discretion 
to craft an equitable 
remedy 
— 
Patterson 
Objective 
“but for”; 
materiality 
can be 
considered a 
factor in 
whether or 
not an action 
or omission 
amounts to a 
breach of the 
duty of 
candor 
Separate frameworks 
would remove the need 
for inferring intent from 
materiality 
Abandon 
Use two separate 
legal frameworks: (1)  
for fraud in patent 
procurement, the 
remedy should be 
patent unenforce-
ability; and (2) for 
failure of fairness 
during patent 
prosecution, courts 
should fashion a 
remedy 
C.  Academics 
Professor Christian Mammen, Professor David Hricik, and the 
Center for Intellectual Property Law and Technology at the 
University of Akron filed amicus briefs representing the interests of 
academics. These three briefs represented nearly 9 percent of the 
total number of briefs that were filed in Therasense. 
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Mammen argued for a clear separation between the elements of 
materiality and intent, the application of Rule 1.56, the emphasis on 
the necessity for clear and convincing evidence of intent with gross 
negligence being insufficient for a finding of intent, and the 
abandonment of the balancing step.127 These high standards tended to 
favor patentees.128 
By contrast, Hricik argued for the abolishment of the doctrine 
unless the court felt compelled to continue the inequitable conduct 
because of stare decisis, in which case the reasonable examiner 
standard should apply for materiality.129 Hricik suggested that courts 
can further clarify this standard by requesting that the PTO provide 
evidence of its practices and regulations.130 Hricik also appeared to 
advocate a high intent standard, arguing that it is insufficient to infer 
intent when, for example, highly material information is intentionally 
withheld.131 Just as Mammen did, Hricik disapproved of the 
balancing step but further argued that a range of equitable remedies 
should be available.132 
Perhaps the complete abolishment of the doctrine may seem pro-
patentee since it would remove any patentee’s fear of facing an 
allegation of the defense during litigation. But this type of scenario 
may amplify the possibility that the entire patent system would 
become anti-patent, allowing bad actors to remain unpunished for 
obtaining and maintaining undeserving patents.133 Therefore, 
considering the potential consequences of eliminating the doctrine, 
perhaps Hricik’s main viewpoint can be considered at least anti-
patent system. But, putting these concerns aside, Hricik’s proposed 
standard for materiality was less stringent compared to that which 
Mammen advocated, signaling an anti-patentee stance; however, 
 
 127. Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors Concerning En Banc Review 
of Inequitable Conduct and in Support of Neither Party at 4–6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390222, at *4–6. 
 128. See infra Table 2. 
 129. Amicus Brief of Professor David Hricik in Support of Neither Party at 14–15, 
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390229, at 
*11–14. 
 130. Id. at 8–9. 
 131. See id. at 14–15. 
 132. See id. at 19; infra Table 2. 
 133. See Brief of Amici Curiae Johnson & Johnson and the Proctor & Gamble Co. in Support 
of Neither Party, supra note 77, at 4–5. 
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Hricik also advocated standards for intent and materiality that would 
likely favor patentees. 
The Center for Intellectual Property Law and Technology at the 
University of Akron advocated a position between Mammen’s and 
Hricik’s extremes. The brief argued: (1) Rule 56, as promulgated by 
the PTO in 1992, should be used as the materiality standard; (2) 
intent cannot be inferred from materiality alone; and (3) if the 
remedy is applied to only the affected claims and not to the entire 
patent, the court should eliminate the balancing test.134 Although this 
materiality standard does not clearly favor patentees, the arguments 
concerning intent and balancing tended to show a preference for 
patentees.135 
Chien’s study, despite a widespread assumption that professors 
are anti-patent, revealed that these amici actually supported patentees 
nearly 40 percent of the time.136 All three of the Therasense amici 
from academia supported standards for inequitable conduct that 
would likely favor patentees. Thus, this result corroborates Chien’s 
rebuttal against the assumption that academia has an anti-patent 
stance. 
 
TABLE 2. Summary of Academics’  
       Arguments That Demonstrate  
          Their Pro-Patentee Stance137 
Academia Materiality Intent Balancing Other 
Professor 
Mammen Rule 1.56 
Separate from materiality; prove by 
clear and convincing evidence; 
gross negligence is insufficient 
Abandon — 
Professor Hricik Reasonable examiner 
Insufficient to infer intent when 
highly material information is 
intentionally withheld 
Disapproved, but 
range of remedies 
should be available 
Abolish 
doctrine 
Center of Law 
and Technology, 
University of 
Akron 
Rule 1.56 
promulgated  
by PTO in 
1992 
Cannot be inferred from materiality 
alone 
If remedy is applied 
only to affected 
claims, eliminate 
— 
 
 134. Brief of Amicus Curiae the University of Akron School of Law, Center for Intellectual 
Property Law & Technology, in Support of Affirmance on En Banc Review at 2–3, Therasense, 
649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595). 
 135. See infra Table 2. 
 136. Chien, supra note 11, at 26–27. 
 137. See supra Part IV.C. 
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D.  Public Interest and  
Public Policy Groups 
Three public interest groups filed amicus briefs in Therasense, 
accounting for nearly 9 percent of the total number of briefs that 
were filed in the case: International Intellectual Property Institute 
(IIPI, a not-for-profit organization); Washington Legal Foundation 
(WLF, a public interest law and policy center); and Association of 
Citizens for Patent Protection in the Public Interest (ACPPPI, a not-
for-profit organization whose mission includes ensuring that patent 
protection laws serve the public interest). While IIPI primarily 
focused its argument on an objective “but for” test for determining 
materiality,138 WLF argued that Rule 1.56(b)(1) should serve as the 
materiality standard and that intent should be established by clear 
and convincing evidence.139 Moreover, WLF focused on the 
balancing test, arguing that “district courts should examine all of the 
equities in determining whether inequitable conduct occurred—
including examining whether the patent holder’s misconduct bears 
an immediate and necessary relation to the relief it seeks from the 
court.”140 Moreover, WLF even suggested that the court withdraw 
from holding the entire patent unenforceable after finding inequitable 
conduct, arguing that this blanket rule fails to affect claims that bear 
“immediate and necessary relation” to the conduct and can only be 
described as punishment—which is improper in equity.141 
ACPPPI had an interesting take on the materiality standard: 
“information is material when it has a natural tendency to influence, 
or is capable of influencing, the PTO’s decision to grant a patent.”142 
ACPPPI argued that the materiality standard in other contexts is not 
so high as to require a “but for” test; such a high standard would 
undermine the public interest in ensuring that relevant information 
 
 138. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Intellectual Property Institute in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,  
-1595), 2010 WL 3481627, at *3. 
 139. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Urging Reversal at 7, 11, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, 
-1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390237, at *7, *11. 
 140. Id. at 5. 
 141. Id. at 20–21; see infra Table 3. 
 142. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ass’n of Citizens for Patent Protection in the Public Interest 
in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance at 4, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-
1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 4622533, at *4. 
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that is known to the patent applicant is brought to the PTO’s 
examination process.143 In fact, ACPPPI’s stance for materiality 
seemed to be reminiscent of a reasonable examiner standard 
(although it did not consider a hypothetical examiner).144 
Furthermore, unlike the majority of the amici across all 
categories, ACPPPI argued that the “single most reasonable 
inference” standard is too high; thus, intent can be inferred when a 
person with a duty to disclose knowingly makes a material false 
statement or omission, misrepresents or withholds information 
despite an objectively high likelihood that the information is 
material, or misrepresents or withholds information despite knowing 
of and consciously disregarding a substantial risk that the 
information was material.145 
In Chien’s study, public interest and public policy groups tended 
to favor non-patentees, supporting patentees less than 30 percent of 
the time.146 Here, the ACPPPI’s low standards, as compared to those 
of other amici, for materiality and intent indicated a preference for 
non-patentees. Conversely, IIPI appeared to support a pro-patentee 
standard yet only addressed one prong of the current inequitable 
conduct framework. Furthermore, although WLF’s proposal for 
Rule 1.56(b)(1) likely did not clearly favor patentees, WLF’s 
argument for a high standard for intent, for an “immediate and 
necessary relation” between the conduct and the relief, and for the 
removal of complete unenforceability may suggest some preference 
toward patentees. Thus, two-thirds of these amici appeared to favor 
patentees, which is somewhat contrary to Chien’s findings. Perhaps 
these results highlight the presence of the amici’s heightened interest 
in advancing the twin purposes of the doctrine: (1) enforcing the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing that binds patent applicants in dealing 
with the public; and (2) protecting the patent system’s “social 
utility.” 
 
 
 
 143. Id. at 5. 
 144. See infra Table 3. 
 145. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ass’n of Citizens for Patent Protection in the Public Interest 
in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance, supra note 142, at 6–7; see infra Table 3. 
 146. Chien, supra note 11, at 26. 
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TABLE 3. Summary of Public Interest  
        and Public Policy Groups’ Arguments  
           for Inequitable Conduct147 
Public Interest 
and Public 
Policy Groups Materiality Intent Balancing Other 
Stance 
Toward 
Patentees 
IIPI Objective “but for” — — — For 
WLF Rule 1.56(b)(1) 
Establish by 
clear and 
convincing 
evidence 
Examine all equities to 
find if inequitable 
conduct occurred, 
including whether 
misconduct bears an 
“immediate and 
necessary relation” to 
the relief sought 
Remove 
unenforce-
ability as a 
penalty 
For 
ACPPI 
“Natural 
tendency to 
influence” 
“Single most 
reasonable 
inference” is too 
high a standard 
— — Against 
 
E.  Industry 
Fifteen amicus briefs were filed by parties in several industries, 
ranging from flooring and lighting companies to biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical firms. These briefs represented the largest group of 
amici in Therasense (about 44 percent of the total number of briefs 
that were filed in the case). 
Interestingly, the majority of the amici in this category agreed 
on a high standard for finding intent: gross negligence is insufficient, 
intent cannot be inferred from materiality alone, and specific or 
deceptive intent must be separately established from materiality by 
clear and convincing evidence.148 Sap America even suggested 
factors that a court may invoke when analyzing whether a patent 
 
 147. See supra Part IV.D. 
 148. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae 43 Patent Practitioners Employed by Eli Lilly & Co., in 
Support of No Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 
2010 WL 3390224; Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,  
-1595), 2010 WL 3390221; Brief of Amici Curiae Ole K. Nilssen & Geo Foundation, Ltd. in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Abbot Diabetes Care, Inc. & Abbot Laboratories’ Brief on 
Rehearing En Banc Supporting Reversal, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,  
-1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390228; Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in 
Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,  
-1595), 2010 WL 3390216. 
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owner had the requisite intent during the alleged misconduct.149 
However, Apotex, a private pharmaceutical company, varied from 
other amici and argued that intent may be established by a “known or 
should have known” standard.150 Moreover, materiality could be 
considered in determining whether an inference of deceptive intent is 
appropriate since materiality and culpability are often intertwined.151 
Considering the large consensus for a high standard concerning 
intent (a pro-patentee stance), the following discussion will mostly 
focus on the materiality and balancing prongs, where the amici’s 
arguments varied significantly. Because of the diverse interests 
across the myriad technologies that the amici represented, the 
following discussion divides the amici into the following 
categories152: (1) bio/pharma companies;153 (2) high-tech 
companies;154 (4) non-practicing entities (NPEs);155 and (4) trade 
associations.156 
 
 149. See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in Support of Neither 
Party at 2–3, supra note 148. 
 150. Brief of Amicus Curiae Apotex, Inc. Not Supporting Any Party at 17–23, Therasense, 
649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 339024, at *17–23. 
 151. Id. at 18. 
 152. The following pairs of amici that fall within different categories but filed joint briefs are 
considered separately for this discussion: Microsoft Corporation (high-tech) and Sanofi-Aventis 
(pharma); and Teva Pharmaceuticals (pharma) and Cisco Systems, Inc. (high-tech). 
 153. These amici are: Apotex, Eisai, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble, 
Sanofi-Avenits, and Teva. 
 154. These amici are: Cisco Systems, Dolby, Ecore, Intel, Microsoft, Sap America, and 
Verizon. 
 155. A non-practicing entity is a “patent owner who does not manufacture or use the patented 
invention, but rather than abandoning the right to exclude, an NPE seeks to enforce its right 
through the negotiation of licenses and litigation.” Miranda Jones, Comment, Permanent 
Injunction, A Remedy by Any Other Name Is Patently Not the Same: How Ebay v. Mercexchange 
Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2007). 
Amici Acacia and 1st Media (who jointly filed a brief in Therasense) have previously been 
considered NPEs and thus are categorized as such here. Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-
Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 160 (2010). 
As Shrestha has noted, “the news media is the only means, in the public domain, of compiling a 
list of NPEs.” Id. at 159. A search of Ole K. Nilssen, an individual inventor of electric lighting, 
produced a recent commentary that described the inventor as an NPE. Peter Zura, District Court 
Awards $2.5M in Sanctions for NPE Asserting Unenforceable Patents, THE 271 PATENT BLOG 
(July 20, 2009, 10:02 AM), http://271patent.blogspot.com/2009/07/district-court-awards-almost-
25m-in.html. Thus, for simplicity here, Nilssen and his exclusive licensee, Geo Foundation, Ltd., 
are considered as part of this category. 
 156. These amici, representing the bio/pharma industry, are: Biotechnology Industry 
Organization (BIO), Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) who joined Teva 
Pharmaceuticals and Cisco in one brief, and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA). 
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1.  Bio/Pharma Companies 
The bio/pharma amici did not reach a clear consensus on a 
standard for materiality. For example, one amici argued for a 
reasonable examiner standard;157 on the other hand, another amici 
argued that the “but for” standard should not be used and even 
suggested that this occasion was an inappropriate time to 
differentiate between Rule 1.56 and a reasonable examiner test.158 Eli 
Lilly advocated for an interesting take on the materiality standard: a 
“standard for materiality must require at least that a patent with an 
illegitimate scope of protection was issued.”159 Additionally, Apotex 
argued that materiality could continue to be assessed by any 
prevailing standards, including Rule 1.56 and the “but for” 
standard.160 
Most of the bio/pharma amici argued for the elimination of the 
balancing step or at least for balancing the remedy against the harm 
(as opposed to comparing materiality and intent within a sliding scale 
approach). On the other hand, two amici (Apotex and Teva) argued 
for the maintenance of this step, which would allow more materiality 
to indicate intent.161 
Notably, Johnson & Johnson and Procter & Gamble filed a joint 
amicus brief and took a different approach to answering the 
questions that the Federal Circuit posed. These amici argued that 
responsibility for policing misconduct before the PTO belongs to the 
PTO rather than to the courts.162 Thus, the federal courts must limit 
their considerations of patent applicant misconduct and only 
adjudicate allegations of misconduct when it is brought upon the 
 
 157. Brief of Eisai Co., Ltd. & Eisai Inc. as Amici Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support 
of Neither Party at 15, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Nos., 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390220, at *15. 
 158. Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al., in Support of Appellees 
and in Favor of Affirmance at 9–10 n.6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,         
-1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 4622535, at *9–10 n.6. 
 159. Brief of Amicus Curiae 43 Patent Practitioners Employed by Eli Lilly & Co., in Support 
of No Party, supra note 148,  
at 4. 
 160. Brief of Amicus Curiae Apotex, Inc. Not Supporting Any Party, supra note 150, at 13–
16; see infra Table 4. 
 161. See infra Table 4. 
 162. Brief of Amici Curiae Johnson & Johnson and the Procter & Gamble Co. in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 77, at 17–18. 
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courts by the litigants’ actions in the course of litigation.163 With such 
a narrowed application of the doctrine, perhaps such a stance may be 
considered as pro-patentee since patentees may face fewer 
inequitable conduct allegations as a result of such an approach.164 
For those that discussed intent and balancing, the bio/pharma 
amici agreed on pro-patentee standards for these two prongs. 
However, the amici greatly differed in their views on materiality. 
Five amici could arguably be considered pro-patentee165 while two 
amici tended to favor non-patentees.166 Chien previously found that 
bio/pharma amici supported patentees 56 percent of the time, 
although the difference was not statistically significant.167 However, 
the division between the bio/pharma amici in Therasense may 
confirm Chien’s findings. 
Nevertheless, Chien also found that the amici’s business models 
were better predictors for whether the amici favored patentees or 
non-patentees: public companies, regardless of industry, favored the 
patentee only 32 percent of the time.168 The bio/pharma amici in 
Therasense were nearly all public companies (only Apotex was 
private),169 and 83 percent of these public companies appeared to be 
pro-patentee. Although the differences between the percentages in 
Chien’s findings and in this Note’s study may be attributed to a 
smaller sample size in Therasense, perhaps it is also indicative of the 
industry’s strong interest in inequitable conduct. Bio/pharma 
companies are typically known for their preference for strong patents 
to protect their investments, yet Chien’s study revealed only weak 
support for this expectation.170 However, Therasense may uniquely 
reveal more pro-patentee support from this industry based on the 
consequences that are associated with inequitable conduct, such as 
the potential invalidation of long-standing and heavily-invested 
patents and of those that are related to the patent at issue. 
 
 163. Id. at 16–17. 
 164. See infra Table 4. 
 165. Eisai; Eli Lilly (although it is perhaps not entirely evident if an “illegitimate scope” 
standard for materiality can clearly favor patentees); Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble; and 
Sanofi-Aventis. 
 166. Apotex and Teva; see infra Table 4. 
 167. Chien, supra note 11, at 24. 
 168. Id. at 24–25. 
 169. Eisai and Teva. 
 170. Chien, supra note 11, at 24–26. 
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 TABLE 4. Summary of Arguments  
      by Amici from the  
       Biotech/Pharma Industry171 
Biotech/Pharma 
Industry Materiality Balancing Other 
Stance 
Toward 
Patentee 
Apotex (Private) Rule 1.56 and  “but for” Maintain  — Against 
Eisai (Public) Objective reasonable examiner 
Fashion appropriate 
remedies — For 
Eli Lilly (Public) “Illegitimate scope” Eliminate — For 
Johnson & Johnson 
(Public) — — 
PTO should police 
the misconduct For 
Procter & Gamble 
(Public) — — 
PTO should police 
the misconduct For 
Sanofi-Aventis 
(Public) Separate from intent 
Sliding scale is 
wrong — For 
Teva (Public) Reject “but for” Maintain — Against 
 
2.  High-Tech Companies 
Turning to the amici within the high-tech industry, they argued 
for a variety of materiality standards, such as the “but for” 
standard,172 the reasonable examiner test,173 or neither.174 
Additionally, for those that discussed the issue, some amici 
advocated for the elimination of the balancing step, although Intel 
urged the court to consider the misconduct to see if, in equity, a 
harsh unenforceability penalty was warranted.175 Verizon echoed the 
remedy concern, suggesting that courts consider a range of 
remedies.176 Because of their support for a high level of materiality, 
 
 171. Supra Part IV.E.1; see Brief for Sanofi-Aventis & Microsoft Corp. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants and Reversal at 11, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3229935, at *11. 
 172. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ecore International, Inc. in Support of Neither Party at 3, 
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390236, at 
*3. 
 173. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corp. in Support of the Appellees at 8, Therasense, 649 
F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 4622534, at *8. 
 174. Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al. in Support of Appellees 
and in Favor of Affirmance, supra note 158. 
 175. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corp. in Support of the Appellees, supra note 173, at 3–4. 
 176. Brief for Verizon Communications Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party on 
Rehearing En Banc at 4–8, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,  
-1595), 2010 WL 2861897, at *4–8. 
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the elimination of the balancing step, and varying levels of remedy, 
only six amici177 tended to favor the patentee. Only one amici178 
favored a non-patentee stance, arguing for weaker materiality 
standards and even for maintaining the current balancing step.179 
According to Chien, high-tech industries, where the cumulative 
nature of innovation creates liabilities for companies that introduce 
new technologies, unsurprisingly tended to oppose patentees;180 in 
fact, her study revealed that high-tech companies supported patentees 
only 36 percent of the time.181 In Therasense, 86 percent of these 
companies supported patentees, perhaps showing this industry’s 
increased concern for the doctrine’s potentially harsh consequences. 
However, Chien conceded that her finding was not statistically 
significant and turned her analysis to a company’s business model, 
finding that public companies favored the patentee only 32 percent of 
the time.182 Of the seven high-tech amici in Therasense, six were 
public companies,183 and 83 percent of those public companies 
appeared to favor the patentees. These results present an interesting 
contrast to Chien’s conclusion that public companies, regardless of 
industry, more often favor an anti-patentee stance. Perhaps the 
industry’s nature of innovation—which often creates liabilities and 
thus causes companies to possibly face increased litigation in which 
there exist significant chances that they will encounter inequitable 
conduct as an affirmative defense—causes the doctrine to raise 
enough concern within the bio/pharma industry, thereby leading to 
this reversal toward a preference for patentees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 177. Dolby, Ecore, Intel, Microsoft, Sap, and Verizon. 
 178. Cisco. 
 179. Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al. in Support of Appellees 
and in Favor of Affirmance, supra note 158, at 3–4; see infra Table 5. 
 180. Chien, supra note 11, at 25. 
 181. Id. at 24. 
 182. Id. at 24–25. 
 183. Cisco, Dolby, Intel, Microsoft, Sap, and Verizon. 
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TABLE 5. Summary of Arguments  
         by Amici from the High-Tech Industry184 
High-tech 
Industry Materiality Balancing Other 
Stance 
Toward 
Patentee 
Cisco (Public) Reject “but for” Maintain — Against 
Dolby (Public) — Eliminate — For 
Ecore (Private) Objective “but for” — — For 
Intel (Public) “Reasonable examiner” 
Balance remedies 
with inequitable 
conduct 
— For 
Microsoft (Public) Separate from intent Sliding scale is wrong — For 
Sap (Public) — — 
Employ factors to 
determine credibility 
of the applicant 
For 
Verizon (Public) — — 
Consider availability 
of remedies less severe 
than unenforceability, 
particularly overriding 
the presumption of 
validity 
For 
 
3.  NPEs 
Because Chien found that a business model can predict an 
amici’s pro- or non-patentee stance, the author separately considered 
NPEs. Acacia Research Corp. and 1st Media, LLC argued that 
inequitable conduct should not exist since the defense lacks any 
statutory foundation.185 Such a complete abolishment of the doctrine 
would allow patentees to avoid facing the defense and thus 
represents a pro-patentee stance.186 Other NPEs, Ole K. Nilssen and 
Geo Foundation, argued that Rule 1.56 should serve as the 
 
 184. Supra Part IV.E.2; see Brief of Amicus Curiae Dolby Laboratories, Inc. in Support of 
Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 2861896; Brief for Sanofi-Aventis & 
Microsoft Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and Reversal, supra note 171; Corrected 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in Support of Neither Party, supra note 148; Brief of 
Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. in Support of Appellees and in Favor of 
Affirmance, supra note 158. 
 185. Brief of Amici Curiae Acacia Research Corp. & 1st Media, LLC in Support of Neither 
Party and in Support of Returning the “Unenforceability” Defense to Its Traditional Scope of 
“Unclean Hands” at 2, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 
2010 WL 3390243, at *2. 
 186. However, this stance may also be considered anti-patent system. See Nolan-Stevaux, 
supra note 79, at 165. 
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materiality standard and that the courts should employ an 
“immediate and necessary relation” requirement between the 
asserted patent rights and misconduct.187 Although the Rule 1.56 
standard is weaker than a “but for” standard and may not necessarily 
favor non-patentees, the high level of intent and a close causal 
connection between the patent rights and misconduct likely protects 
a patentee; thus, Ole K. Nilssen and Geo Foundation’s stance may be 
considered pro-patentee.188 These results confirm Chien’s findings 
that NPEs favor patentees nearly all of the time. Moreover, these 
results are unsurprising given that the often-litigious NPEs would 
likely prefer to avoid having inequitable conduct defenses asserted 
against them. 
 
TABLE 6. Summary of  
           Arguments by NPEs189 
NPEs Materiality Balancing Other 
Stance 
Toward 
Patentee 
Acacia — — Doctrine should  not exist For 
1st Media — — Doctrine should  not exist For 
Ole K. Nilssen Rule 1.56 “Immediate and  necessary relation” — For 
Geo Foundation Rule 1.56 “Immediate and  necessary relation” — For 
 
4.  Trade Associations 
Three trade associations that represent the bio/pharma industry 
also filed amicus briefs: BIO, PhRMA, and GPhA. These amici 
varied in their arguments for a materiality standard: BIO argued for a 
“but for” standard that is considered at the time of trial,190 while 
PhRMA argued that information is material “only if that information 
 
 187. Brief of Amici Curiae Ole K. Nilssen & Geo Foundation, Ltd. in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. & Abbot Laboratories’ Brief on Rehearing En Banc 
Supporting Reversal, supra note 148, at 4–5. 
 188. See infra Table 6. 
 189. See supra Part IV.E.3. 
 190. Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 148, at 21. 
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establishes that one or more of the claims asserted in the litigation is 
invalid.”191 However, in practice, the differences between these two 
standards may not be significant, and both appear to require a high 
level of materiality. Moreover, BIO and PhRMA agreed that the 
balancing step must be abandoned. Overall then, these two trade 
associations appeared to take a pro-patentee stance. On the other 
hand, GPhA argued against a “but for” standard and for maintenance 
of the current state of inequitable conduct, and thus GPha seemingly 
favored a non-patentee stance.192 
Chien found that groups that represent bio/pharma/chem only 
supported patentees 59 percent of the time, and although the sample 
size was statistically insignificant, the result still confirmed the 
perceptions of the patent group.193 Two-thirds of the trade 
associations’ briefs in Therasense favored patentees; although three 
amici may have been a statistically insignificant sample size, the 
trade associations’ arguments were still consistent with the 
expectation that their industries would favor strong patent protection. 
 
TABLE 7. Summary of Arguments by  
        Industrial Trade Associations194 
Industrial Trade 
Associations Materiality Balancing Stance Toward Patentee 
BIO “But for” Eliminate For 
PhRMA “Asserted claims” Eliminate For 
GPhA Reject “but for” Maintain Against 
 
F.  Summary 
The percentages of Therasense amici, by category, that favored 
pro-patentee standards for inequitable conduct are summarized in 
Table 8. Table 8 also provides Chien’s results for comparison. As 
shown in Table 8, three categories of amici (“Bar Associations and 
 
 191. Brief of Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, 
-1595). 
 192. Infra Table 7; see Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al., in 
Support of Appellees and in Favor of Affirmance, supra note 158. 
 193. Chien, supra note 11, at 26. 
 194. See supra Part IV.E.4. 
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Intellectual Property Associations,” “Public Interest and Public 
Policy Groups,” and the “High-tech Industry”)195 varied from those in 
Chien’s results. Moreover, public companies, regardless of industry, 
also contrasted with those in Chien’s findings. 
 
TABLE 8. Percentages of Therasense  
         Amici that Favor Patentees, by Category,  
        as Compared to Chien’s Findings 
 
Category 
 
Percentage of Therasense  
Amici Favoring Patentee 
Percentage of Time That  
Amici Favored Patentee  
According to Chien’s Findings 
PTO 100 % 28 % 
Bar/IP Associations 100 % 55 % 
Academia 100 % Nearly 40 % 
Public Interest/ 
Policy Group 66 % 20 % 
Bio/Pharma Industry 
71 %  
(83 % of public,  
bio/pharma companies) 
56 %  
(public companies,  
regardless of industry: 32 %) 
High-Tech Industry 
86 %  
(83 % of public,  
high-tech companies) 
36 %  
(public companies,  
regardless of industry: 32 %) 
NPEs 100 % 98 % 
Trade Associations 66 % 59 % 
 
V.  PROPOSAL  
AND JUSTIFICATION 
Amicus briefs “reflect the complexity of [major commercial and 
societal] concerns”196 and, as such, represent an important source “for 
studying patent groups and their interests in the patent system.”197 
The thirty-four briefs that were filed in Therasense thus provide 
useful insight into how inequitable conduct affects the various 
contexts of patent law that each amici represents. The briefs also 
included proposals, some traditional and others unique, on how the 
 
 195. Chien’s findings rebutted the assumption that academia was anti-patentee. Although 
academics appear to favor patentees at a higher percentage rate than Chien’s findings indicate that 
it does, the percentage found in analyzing the Therasense academia amici further corroborates 
Chien’s rebuttal. 
 196. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 197. Chien, supra note 11, at 6. 
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doctrine should be modified. In light of these arguments, this Note’s 
proposal seeks to synthesize the myriad views presented by the 
diverse amici into a workable test: (1) courts should adopt Rule 1.56 
as the materiality standard, which the Federal Circuit can further 
clarify by establishing factors for lower courts to consider in 
evaluating this prong; (2) courts should reaffirm specific intent to 
deceive as the appropriate standard for intent; and (3) courts should 
eliminate a sliding scale approach to the balancing step and maintain 
the harsh penalty of unenforceability.  
Moreover, the Therasense amici, both within each category and 
across categories, came to a consensus on certain viewpoints. The 
Federal Circuit should take particular note of that agreement. On the 
other hand, as Part IV revealed, certain amici’s arguments appeared 
to be surprising based on expectations of their viewpoints according 
to Chien’s findings. These contrasting results shed light on how 
inequitable conduct can particularly impact the contexts of patent 
law that these amici represent. Thus, this proposal merely suggests 
that the court should pay particular attention to certain amici that 
may face significant consequences from inequitable conduct in ways 
that may not be present in other doctrines of patent law. 
A.  Listening to the Amici 
Amici often influence courts; the federal government and the 
PTO have been particularly successful in swaying the Federal Circuit 
and even the Supreme Court.198 However, because of the doctrine’s 
widespread ramifications—which extend beyond the litigants and 
impact the court system, patent practitioners, and the PTO—the 
Federal Circuit should have taken a closer look at arguments that the 
varied amici advanced instead of only considering those amici with a 
history of success with the courts.199 
Part V revealed that three categories of amici (Bar Associations 
and Intellectual Property Associations, Public Interest and Public 
Policy Groups, and the High-tech Industry) and public companies, 
 
 198. Id. at 28–29. 
 199. The Federal Circuit, in its en banc Therasense decision, appears to have at least 
acknowledged some amici. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1294 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Notably, both the American Bar Association and the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association, which represent a wide spectrum of interests, support requiring but-for 
materiality . . . .”); id. at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“As the PTO persuasively argues in its 
amicus brief . . . .”). 
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regardless of industry, surprisingly favored pro-patentee standards. 
Because of the potential adverse consequences on the careers of 
patent agents and attorneys, perhaps a court should give less 
credence to bar associations and intellectual property associations 
representing these practitioners here. A more significant preference 
for pro-patentee standards (as compared to the preference that is 
illustrated in Chien’s results) by public interest and public policy 
groups may reveal their concerns with maintaining the integrity of 
the patent system, one of the key purposes of inequitable conduct. 
Moreover, high-tech industry and public companies’ preferences for 
patentees likely reflect these amici’s heightened concerns for having 
to potentially battle the defense and face the invalidation of their 
long-standing, heavily-invested patents, signaling their “commercial 
interest” at stake. Consequently, the Federal Circuit should 
particularly note briefs filed by public interest and public policy 
groups, high-tech industries, and public companies. 
The PTO’s amicus brief also should be carefully considered 
because of the close relationship between the ex parte process of 
patent prosecution in front of the PTO and the subsequent allegations 
of inequitable conduct. In fact, the government is often particularly 
persuasive and often predicts the accurate “winner” of a case.200 
However, this proposal posits that the Federal Circuit should not 
only grant this amicus significant consideration but also equally 
consider other amici, especially those that are highlighted above. 
B.  Fashioning the Test 
The amici varied significantly across all categories in their 
opinions on the materiality prong. Likewise, the en banc panel also 
disagreed as to the appropriate standard for this element,201 and thus 
the standard for materiality may not necessarily be entirely settled 
law yet. On the one hand, a “but for” standard may not appropriately 
catch bad actors who affirmatively withhold or misrepresent material 
information to the PTO but whose misconduct did not affect the 
validity of the patent. On the other hand, a reasonable examiner 
 
 200. Chien, supra note 11, at 31. Contra Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1276, 1293–94 (disagreeing 
with the PTO’s argument for Rule 1.56 as the standard for materiality). 
 201. See supra Part II.C. 
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standard also appears to be too amorphous and forces the court to 
consider the hypothetical examiner. 
Therefore, Rule 1.56 may be an appropriate middle ground for 
the courts to adopt, but it may not set the bar high enough to warrant 
unenforceability as punishment. Some amici also argued that courts 
are not bound to follow regulations that the PTO sets. Moreover, oral 
arguments during the Therasense en banc hearing showed that the 
Federal Circuit exhibited some reluctance toward this standard, 
particularly with the potential breadth of Rule 1.56(b)(2).202 The 
majority’s opinion and adoption of the “but for” standard reflects 
these concerns.203 However, although the PTO’s regulations would 
not be binding on the courts, the courts can still look to the PTO for 
useful guidance and choose to adopt the PTO’s standard. 
Then again, perhaps the materiality standard that the court 
ultimately adopts will have little impact,204 and the Federal Circuit’s 
main concern over materiality is unfounded. The amici that are under 
examination here and other scholarly commentary have suggested 
that the Federal Circuit should simply articulate factors to aid courts 
in determining materiality.205 Even given the Therasense majority’s 
“but for” standard, delineating specific factors as additional guidance 
for courts to look to would surely help, especially in light of the 
court’s new “affirmative egregious misconduct” exception. 
The vast majority of all amici tended to agree that the level of 
intent for a finding of inequitable conduct must be high. Under such 
a standard, gross negligence would not be enough to satisfy this 
prong; moreover, intent must be established independent of 
materiality and satisfy a clear and convincing evidence standard. 
This harmony across the diverse interests within the patent system 
should signal to the court that this standard is appropriate. However, 
if such a consensus exists, why is intent even at issue? Intent was 
shown to be the more critical factor as compared to materiality or the 
 
 202. Bruce M. Wexler, Today’s En Banc Oral Argument in Therasense: The Federal Circuit 
Wrestles with How Much to Reform Inequitable Conduct, PAUL HASTINGS STAY CURRENT: A 
CLIENT ALERT FROM PAUL HASTINGS (Nov. 2010), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/ 
publications/1757.pdf?wt.mc_ID=1757.pdf. 
 203. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293–95. 
 204. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 28 n.70. 
 205. Id. at 56–57; see Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 148, at 18. 
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balancing step.206 However, the Federal Circuit previously appeared 
to have a different understanding of intent than lower courts had,207 
amplifying the confusion that surrounded the doctrine’s framework. 
The Federal Circuit’s reaffirmance of the requirement of a specific 
intent to deceive is in line with the majority of the amici’s view, and 
perhaps the Therasense court even took this into account in reaching 
its holding for intent. 
The amici in Therasense varied more in their opinions on the 
balancing step, with arguments for the maintenance, modification, or 
elimination of its current framework. However, as some amici 
argued, if the bar for the other two prongs of inequitable conduct is 
set sufficiently high, the balancing step is unnecessary.208 Moreover, 
in practice, this step appears to be a mere formality rather than a 
substantive part of the doctrine’s framework.209 Regardless of its 
actual role in practice, this prong’s articulation at least needed 
clarification. Moreover, as some notable amici argued,210 any sliding 
scale approach should be eliminated. 
Although other amici argued that the balancing step should 
entail an inquiry into whether unenforceability is a warranted penalty 
and whether the court should fashion remedies that are more 
appropriate to the conduct, these arguments seem unavailing. The 
other two prongs’ standards are set sufficiently high such that a 
finding of inequitable conduct only arises for misconduct that 
warrants the harsh penalty of unenforceability. By maintaining such 
a harsh penalty, the courts may hopefully deter bad actors from 
adversely affecting the patent system. Thus, the societal interest in 
the patent system can be protected, thereby furthering a key purpose 
of inequitable conduct. Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s grant of 
unenforceability “where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the 
unfair benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim”211 should be 
revised. 
 
 206. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 29–39. 
 207. Id. at 43. 
 208. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors Concerning En 
Banc Review of Inequitable Conduct and in Support of Neither Party, supra note 127, at 6. 
 209. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 33. 
 210. See supra Part III. 
 211. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of inequitable conduct has led to several serious 
consequences that have impacted the court system, patentees and 
their industries, patent attorneys and agents, and the PTO. The 
plethora of amicus briefs that were filed in Therasense—which 
represent an important source of information that highlights the 
many contexts of patent law and that can even influence a court’s 
decision—demonstrates the widespread interest concerning the 
doctrine’s reform. Although the amici did not entirely agree on 
exactly how the doctrine should be reshaped, clarification of the 
exact standards for courts to use in finding inequitable conduct is 
necessary to alleviate the doctrine’s problems. Nonetheless, the 
Therasense majority’s new interpretation of the doctrine may need 
some additional reformation. A majority of the amici voiced that a 
finding of intent should require more than just gross negligence. 
Moreover, sliding scale formulations of the balancing step should be 
eliminated, and more specific guidance on performing materiality 
inquiries may be useful. However, the PTO’s Rule 1.56 should be the 
materiality standard that the court adopts. With clearly articulated 
standards for inequitable conduct, courts should be able to eliminate 
the “plague” on the patent system. 
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